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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Eminent Domain - "Just
Compensation" Does Not Include Payment of Interest from
Time of "Taking" to Day of Trial. - A condemnation pro-
ceeding was brought by the South Carolina Highway Depart-
ment condemning part of the Defendant's right-of-way. The
Trial Judge charged the jury to the effect that interest from
the date of the "taking" to the date of the trial is a proper
consideration in arriving at a land owner's "just compen-
sation," notwithstanding the fact that the applicable state
statute which provided for such proceedings did not ex-
plicitly provide for the payment of interest. HELD: Re-
versed. Interest from the time of the "taking" to the day
of the trial is not to be considered in ascertaining "just com-
pensation" to be paid by the South Carolina Highway De-
partment to a condemnee. S. C. Hwy. Dept. v. So. Ry., 239
S. C. 1, 121 S. E. 2d 236 (1961).
From the day of the Lords Proprietors until the adoption
of its Constitution of 1868, South Carolina did not pay any
compensation for private property taken for public use. Wi/-
son v. Greenville County, 110 S. C. 321, 327, 96 S. E. 301, 303
(1928); Lindsay v. The Comm'rs, 2 Bay 38 (S. C. 1796);
Patrick & Mannigault v. Comm'rs of Cross Roads on Charles-
ton Neck, 4 McCord 641 (S. C. 1828). Nevertheless, the
present State Constitution guarantees that "just compen-
sation" shall be paid. S. C. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1895).
It is inferable from the State Constitution that a "taking"
for public use by the State Highway Department should re-
ceive preferential treatment over a "taking" by a public
utility. City of Spartanburg v. Belk's Dep't Store, S. C.
CONST. art. 9, § 20 (1895) ; S. C. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (1895) ;
199 S. C. 458; 20 S. E. 2d 157 (1942). If a condemnation
by the State Highway Department produces a benefit to the
land owner, such benefit is applied toward offsetting his
damages. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAR0LINA § 33-136 (1952),
City of Spartanburg v. Belk's Dep't Store, supra. However,
any benefit which inures to a landowner by virtue of a taking
by a public utility is not to be considered. S. C. CONST. art.
9, § 20 (1895). If the "taking" is by a Public Utility, the
General Assembly has prdvided for the payment of interest
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pendente lite. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 25-57,
25-110 (1952). Nevertheless, a federal court has declared
that, even if the South Carolina statute did not provide for
the payment of interest, it is collectable under the constitu-
tional provision guaranteeing "just compensation." In re
South Carolina Public Service Authority, 37 F. Supp. 28, 31
(E. D. S. C. 1941). Also, the South Carolina Supreme Court
has unequivocally held that the State Constitution is self-exe-
cuting and that no act of the General Assembly is necessary
to implement the "just compensation" provision. McColl v.
Marlboro Graded School Dist. No. 10, 143 S. C: 120, 124;
141 S. E. 265, 266 (1927); Chick Springs Water Co., Inc.
v. State Highway Dep't, 159 S. C. 481, 497; 157 S. E. 842,
848 (1932). The Legislature can provide the "yardstick"
by which compensation is measured. City of Spartanburg v.
Belk's Dep't Store, supra; Smith v. City of Greenville, 229
S. C. 252, 92 S. E. 2d 591 (1960). Nevertheless, it cannot place
a monetary limit on what is "just." Chick Springs Water Co.,
Inc. v. State Highway Dep't, supra at 504, 157 S. E. at 851;
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312,
37 L. Ed. 463 (1893). Both the State Constitution and the
"due process" clause of the United States Constitution are to
be considered in a condemnation proceeding by the South Car-
olina Highway Department. Huston v. Town of West Green-
ville, 126 S. C. 484, 496, 120 S. E. 236, 239 (1923) ; Chicago
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41
L. Ed. 979 (1897). The United States Supreme Court holds
that, in a taking by the United States, interest should be
paid if payment for the land is not made contemporaneously
with the "taking." Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States,
261 U. S. 299, 67 L. Ed. 664 (1923). The overwhelming
majority of the states concur with the United States Su-
preme Court, e.g., Appleton Water Works Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 154 Wis. 121, 142 N. W. 476, 478; Annot., 36
A. L. R. 2d 413 (1954), and a holding which denies the
recovery of interest at the legal rate from the time of the
"taking" to the final determination of the case is a minority
view. San Francisco & S. J. Valley R. Company v. Levis-
ton, 134 Cal. 412, 66 P. 473; Annot., 36 A. L. R. 2d 426 (1954).
It would appear that if a landowner is entitled to be paid
for his land, he is entitled to be paid on time. The Consti-
tutions of the United States and of South Carolina use the
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identical words "just compensation." The United States Su-
preme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution as providing that "just compen-
sation" necessitates payment being made contemporaneously
with the taking and if not so made, interest should be paid.
The Fourteenth Amendment (due process clause applicable
to the States) guarantees that no state shall deprive its citi-
zens of property without due process. As the state must stay
within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, it is arguable that a denial of interest by
the state is a denial of due process under the United States
Constitution. Logic would seem to command that "just com-
pensation" should mean the same in both the State and the
United States Constitution. Irrespective of the national con-
stitutional question, it cannot be convincingly argued that
a dollar paid today represents the same value of a dollar
owed two years ago when one is deprived of the use of it
for two years. As the money when paid should represent
the true value of the property when it was condemned, it
seems that interest is not an addition to but is a component
of just compensation.
JAMES OTIS DUNN, SR.
EVIDENCE - Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evi-
dence in a Civil Case. - In a New York divorce proceeding
instituted by her husband, defendant wife moved to suppress
evidefice of her alleged adultery. Pursuant to a New York
decr6e of separation, the wife had been living apart from her
husband and maintained her own apartment. The evidence
she sought to suppress was admittedly procured in a delib-
erate planned search of her apartment, conducted by her
husband. The New York Civil Rights Statute § 8 provides,
"The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures, shall not be violated . . ." On motion to suppress evi-
dence, HELD, granted. Evidence procured by an unreason-
able search conducted by a private person should be sup-
pressed in a civil action. Sackter v. Sackler, 224 NYS 2d 790
(1962).
At common law, the admissibility of evidence in court is
not affected by the illegal means employed to obtain it. 8
1962]
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WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940). Although
"unreasonable searches and seizures" are barred both by the
federal and the typical State constitution, U. S. CONST.
amend. IV; S. C. CONST. art. I, § 16; N. Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 12, evidence obtained in violation of these guarantees has
been held freely admissible in criminal proceedings. both in
the federal, Stockwell v. United States, 23 Fed. Cas. 116 (No.
13,466) (C. C. D. Me. 1870); United States v. Distillery, 25
Fed. Cas. 853 (No. 14,961) (C. C. E. D. Va. 1876), and state
courts. Town of Blacksburg v. Beam, 104 S. C. 147, 88 S. E.
447 (1916) ; State v. Waystaff, 115 S. C. 198, 105 S. E. 283
(1920). In 1914 the Supreme Court held that evidence ob-
tained by an unreasonable search and seizure would be ex-
cluded in criminal trials in federal courts as a constitutional
requirement, Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. Ed.
652 (1914). In 1949 the core of the Fourth Amendment was
held to be enforceable against the states through the due
process clause; adoption of the exclusionary rule by the state
courts, however, was specifically held not to be essential to
due process. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 93 L. Ed. 1782
(1949). Thereafter, the new rule was extended to prohibit
federal law enforcement officers from testifying in a state
criminal prosecution to evidence illegally obtained by them,
notwithstanding such evidence was admissible in the state
proceeding under state law. Rea v. United States, 350 U. S.
214, 100 L. Ed. 233 (1955). And despite the absence of fed-
eral agents, evidence obtained by unreasonable state searches
has also been held inadmissible in federal courts. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U. S. 206, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960)., In
1961 the Supreme Court overruled its narrow 1949 construc-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states through
the due process clause, Wolfe v. Colorado, supra, and imposed
the federal exclusionary rule on state courts requiring the
exclusion in criminal proceedings of illegally obtained evi-
dence though acquired solely by state officers. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U. S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). The federal Constitu-
tion, the New York Constitution, and the New York Civil
Rights Law all employ the same language forbidding unrea-
sonable intrusion. U. S. CONST. amend. IV; N. Y. CONST.
art. I § 12; N. Y. Civil Rights Law § 8. However, the first
ten amendments of the federal Constitution are safeguards
against law officials and Government authority only. Silver-
[Vol. 14
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man, v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961).
Similarly, the provision of the New York Constitution relates
solely to sovereign authorities and its agencies and not to
private parties. People v. Appelbaum, 301 N. Y. 738, 95
N. E. 2d 410 (1950). On the other hand; Judge Cardozo long
ago recognized the applicability of the Civil Rights Law to
private as well as official trespassers. People v. DeFore,
242 N .Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926). Prior to Mapp v. Ohio,
supra, the states were about evenly divided in their adoption
of the exclusionary rule in criminal prosecutions, Elkins v.
United States, 364 U. S. 206 at 225, but only one state has
applied the rule in civil proceedings, Lebel v. Swinciki, 354
Mich. 427, 93 N. W. 2d 281 (1958).
The instant decision should evoke widespread interest since
it interprets a statute whose operative language is identical
with that of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution and of comparable provisions of many State Con-
stitutions and statutes. Given the prior judicial construction
of the New York statute, the holding of the present case is
not unexpected. But it is quite another matter to extend this
rule to other jurisdictions which lack the New York Civil
Rights statutory basis and judicial gloss. Such an extension
might come about in two ways, either as a construction of con-
stitutional provisions inhibiting searches and seizures or as
an exclusionary rule of evidence fashioned by courts in their
control of proceedings before them. In either event, special
problems are presented. First of all, absent the now con-
trolling constitutional doctrine of Mapp, the states have been
divided on their policy of whether or not to exclude unlaw-
fully seized evidence even in criminal proceedings where pro-
tection of the defendant is supposedly at its maximum. Sec-
ondly, even if all states accepted on their own the propriety
of excluding such evidence in criminal cases, it by no means
follows that they should do so in civil litigation. The Fourth
Amendment, as construed by Weeks, was held to abrogate a
common law rule of evdence which existed at the time of the
amendment's adoption and which, apart from that amend-
ment, has 'remained unchanged to the present day. The
Fourth, like the other amendments of the Bill of Rights, was
adopted as a restraint on governmental police power, and
under Weeks it operates by obstructing the truth-seeking
process in litigation through exclusion of evidence which is
1962]
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logically relevant and material. In fact, Professor Wigmore
classes it as one of "those rules which rest on no purpose
of improving the search after truth, but on the willingness
to yield to requirements of extrinsic policy." 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE 2184 (2d ed. 1940). The justification for the
rule is, of course, the prevention of injuries to citizens by
removing incentives to violate their rights by seizure of evi-
dence, i.e., it is a device to enforce the Fourth amendment's
command, and the courts have probably been justfied in
striking this balance between the requirements of prosecution
and the prevention of abusive searches and seizures. The
basic rationale does not come into play when the case is a
civil action between private parties, for here no governmental
action is involved in the acquisition of the evidence. The in-
centives to unlawful search and seizure are perhaps not as
great. Trespass actions are available and are probably not
so beset with the difficulties which attend trespass actions
against police officers and other governmental personnel
seizing property for evidence. Here, it is at least arguable
that the public interest in securing full, relevant and ma-
terial evidence in civil proceedings overrides the aid which
an exclusionary rule would undoubtedly give towards in-
hibiting private raids and searches. If these considerations
would not warrant the courts extending the exclusionary rule
to civil actions through an interpretation of constitutional
guarantees, they should equally inhibit a court from barring
on its own and without specific statutory sanction logically
relevant evidence, i.e., overriding the common law acceptance
of illegally seized evidence.
DOUGLAS L. HINDS.
FEDERAL INCOME TAX Year of Taxability - In-
come Received Either as Part Payindht f6r Peopetty Under
arn Option to #turchaie 6r ad C6rigiderati6n for Eirtehgion
of Option. - Taxpayer in 1649 granted a license to a cor-
poration to manufacture alid sell licensor's product under a
trademark for a stipulated i'oyalty. The term of the lidense
was for five years, at the end of which the licensee had the
option to purchase taxpayer's interest in the trademark for
$350,000. Alternatively, the licensee could, upon payment
of $50,000, obtain a five year extension of the license agree-
[Vol. 14
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ment, and, at the close of any calendar month within that
extension, could purchase taxpayer's interest in the trade-
mark for $300,000. The Tax Court held that the $50,000
was not taxable in 1954 when received by the taxpayer. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed a petition in the
Third Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals for re-
view of the decision of the Tax Court. HELD: Affirmed.
The $50,000, which was intended to serve both as considera-
tion for an extension of the agreement and as payment on
the purchase price should the option to purchase be exercised,
was not includible in taxpayer's income until the option was
exercised or had lapsed. Comm'r v. Dill Co., 294 F. 2d 291
(3d Cir. 1961).
The general rule for the taxable year of inclusion is that
the amount of any item of gross income shall be included
in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by
the taxpayer. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 451 (a); Burnet v.
Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 75 L. Ed. 383 (1931).
In support of the general rule the courts have developed the
"claim of right" doctrine, first stated in North Am. Oil Consol.
v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 76 L. Ed. 1197 (1932), to the effect
that if the taxpayer has received income under a claim of
right, he must include it in the year in which he received it.
Comm'r v. Alamitos Land Co., 311 U. S. 679, 85 L. Ed.
437 (1940) ; Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193, 78 L. Ed. 725
(1933). When the courts speak of income held under a claim
of right, they generally mean that the taxpayer has received
and treated the monies as his own. Comm'r v. Security
Flour Mills Co., 135 F. 2d 165 (10th Cir. 1943); Moore v.
Thomas, 131 F. 2d 611 (5th Cir. 1942). This doctrine has
been applied in cases where payments received for future
rent were held taxable income upon receipt. Comm'r v.
Lyon, 97 F. 2d 70 (9th Cir. 1938); Renwick v. United
States, 87 F. 2d 123 (7th Cir. 1936). The rule that income is
taxable in the year received has been modified where con-
tingencies are involved. Generally, a contingency in the
taxable year with respect either to a liability and its en-
forcement or to the collectibility of income will prevent ac-
crual. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Magruder, 174 F. 2d 896
(4th Cir. 1949); Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. United States,
141 F. 2d 163 (3d Cir. 1943). Such contingencies have been
found in cases involving deposits and advance payments for
1962]
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the sale of property, the nature of which income could not
be determined until a subsequent year. Doyle v. Comm'r,
110 F. 2d 157 (2d Cir. 1940); Bourne v. Comm'r, 62 F.
2d 648 (4th Cir. 1933). Similarly, where a contract to as-
sign a lease provides for forfeiture of a deposit if a second
payment is not made when due, an advance payment is not
considered income until the lapse of the period in which
,he purchaser may or may not default. Baird v. United States,
c65 F. 2d 911 (5th Cir. 1933). Where there is an option or
.an executory contract for the sale of property and part
:payment is made therefor, the payment may become part of
,he purchase price and is taxable in the year the option is
exercised or the executory contract completed. Doyle v.
Comm'r, supra; Aiken v. Comm'r, 35 F. 2d 620 (8th Cir.
1929). If an option is terminated without being exercised
or a down payment on the purchase price is forfeited, the
entire income is taxable as ordinary income in the year
of termination or forfeiture. Hunter v. Comm'r, 140 F.
2d 954 (5th Cir. 1944); Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co.
v. Corm'r, 99 F. 2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938). Whether the
contract specifies that payment for an option to buy prop-
erty may or may not be applied against the purchase price
contained in the option, the payment is not income at the
time of its receipt and becomes taxable only in the year when
its purpose and nature can be determined. Comm'r v. Dill Co.,
supra; Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Comm'Wr, supra.
The development of the exception, in the case of a con-
tingency, to the general rule that monies are taxable in the
year received is a marked advancement in the law of taxa-
tion. The older view that income received in advance or con-
tingently is taxable upon receipt seems quite opposed to the
rule of common sense. The more reasonable view would insist
that the taxation of such payments be deferred until the
period in which the income is realized, where the nature
of the proceeds can not be determined at the time the pay-
ment is made. In the instant case the court was faced with
the problem of whether the payment was a royalty, consid-
eration for the license agreement, or part of the purchase
price. The only logical result that the court could reach
was that in the year of receipt of the payment it was im-
possible to determine whether the payment would represent
ordinary income or capital gain. Such rationale affords a
438 [Vol. 14
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reasonable and desirable result in solidifying the rule that
income should be taxable only when the event determining
its nature has occurred.
DONALD R. McALISTER.
TORTS AND CONTRACT - Implied Warranty and
Negligence - Liability of Cigarette Manufacturer for
Lung Cancer of Remote Vendee. - Plaintiff, remote
vendee, purchased advertised product of defendant cigarette
manufacturer on the representation that the product was
non-harmful to nose, throat, and accessory organs. Plain-
tiff contracted lung cancer, and brought action for negligence
alleging that defendant's product contained ingredients mak-
ing it unsafe for human consumption. A second cause of ac-
tion was brought for breach of implied warranty alleging that
defendant cigarette manufacturer represented that the smok-
ing of its product was not harmful. Plaintiff attempted to
establish a causal relationship between smoking and lung
cancer by expert testimony. The trial court dismissed the
warranty count and granted defendant's motion for a directed
verdict as to the negligence. Plainiff appealed on the ground
that he was denied the right, allegedly guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, to have his case sub-
mitted to the jury. HELD: Reversed and remanded. Whether
the cigarette smoker who had contracted lung cancer and
who sues the manufacturer that advertised its product as
non-harmful had established a breach of implied warranty
of merchantability was an issue for the jury. And the ques-
tion of whether the cigarette manufacturer was negligent in
failing to conduct additional tests to determine if use of
its product caused lung cancer and in failing to give warn-
ing of any cancer producing ingredients that might cause.
cancer of the type contracted by the plaintiff was also for
the jury. Pritchard v. Liggitt and Myers Tobacco Co., 295
F. 2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
Manufacturer's liability arising from negligence in the
manufacturing process has undergone extensive change in the
United States. One whose negligence in the manufacture of
an inherently dangerous article causing injury is liable to
the injured party. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57
Am. Dec. 455 (1852). However, absent privity of contract
19621
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between the negligent manufacturer and the injured party,
there could be no recovery for negligent manufacture of a
product not inherently dangerous. Loop v. Litchfieid, 42
N. Y. 351, 1 Am. Rep. 513 (1870). Today, however, where
negligence in the manufacturing process causes any article
to be dangerous to life or limb, a remote vendee may recover
against the manufacturer who failed to exercise due care
even though there is as between the parties no privity. Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050
(1916). Thus, where a cigarette, defective through negligent
construction, caused injury to a smoker, liability was imposed
on the manufacturer. DeLape v. Liggitt and Myers Tobacco
Co., 25 F. Supp. 1006 (S. D. Calif. 1939), Modified 109 F. 2d
598 (9th Cir. 1940). Further, where an article is so adver-
tised that its use, as urged by the maker, produces injury,
the maker has been held liable for negligent advertising.
Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 213 N. C. 775, 197 S. E. 757
(1938); Crist v. Art Metals Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 234
N. Y. Supp. 496 (1st Dept. 1930), aff'd 255 N. Y. 624, 175
N. E. 341 (1930). In Pennsylvania, if persons are likely to
come into contact with a dangerous article, the one responsi-
ble for its existence is under an affirmative obligation to
impose an adequate measure of protection for their benefit.
Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A. 2d 850
(1945). The standard thereby imposed is every reasonable
precaution experience and knowledge of the danger can sug-
gest. MacDougall v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., 311
Pa. 387, 166 A. 589 (1933).
The modern rules of implied warranty are, like the negli-
gence theories, the products of metamorphosis. Formerly, in
most jurisdictions, without deceit or warranty, the rule of
caveat emptor applied, Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48 (Sup.
Ct. N. Y. 1804), 2 Am. Dec. 215, and privity of contract was
necessary to recover. Chysky v. Drake, 235 N. Y. 468, 139
N. E. 576 (1932). Today, however, privity is no longer a
prerequisite to recovery for breach of warranty, Baxter v.
Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409 (1931), so that
the remote vendee who found a fragment of a dead mouse
in a tobacco container was allowed recovery for breach of
implied warranty. Foley v. Liggitt and Myers Tobacco Co.,
241 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1930), 136 Misc. Rep. 368.
While a plaintiff's action in deceit was held to be a valid
[Vol. 14
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cause of action against a manufacturer who allegedly adver-
tised his cigarettes as healthful and harmless to the respira-
tory system, Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.
2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956), it is also true that advertising can
create an implied warranty by the manufacturer for breach
of which the remote vendee was allowed recovery. Huscher
v. Pfost, 122 Colo. 301, 221 P. 2d 931 (1950); Decker v.
Cappe, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S. W. 2d 828 (1942). Although
Pennsylvania denies recovery for breach of implied war-
ranty for any special purposes of the vendee, nevertheless to
such vendee there is an implied warranty of merchantability:
that the article is properly made (that due care was exercised
in the manufacturing process) and that it is fit for the gen-
eral purposes for which it was manufactured. Franz Equip-
ment Co. v. Leo'Butler Co., 370 Pa. 459, 88 A. 2d 702 (1952).
The instant case, it would seem, is correctly decided. The
law must undertake to protect the rights and lives of those
subject to it. Medical authorities agree that smoking actually
does cause lung cancer among some users. Notwithstanding
knowledge of possible danger to some smokers, cigarette
manufacturers continue to advertise their products as "non-
harmful" or rendering "no ill effects" to smokers. This
practice is unfair and unjust. In Green v. American Tobacco
Co., (S. D. Fla., 1960; verdict for defendant, now on appeal
to appellate court), the jury's verdict required both negli-
gence and breach of warranty against the cigarette manu-
facturer for liability. The essential difference between war-
ranty liability and negligence liability is that "excusable ignor-
ance" of a defect or of the properties of a product is im-
material with respect to warranty liability. In the principal
case, both issues are for the jury, with possible recovery
on either issue. That the cigarette manufacturer should be
liable to the remote vendee based on a single jury issue,
whether it be negligence or breach of warranty, is a propo-
sition necessary to protect the individual and increase the
responsibility of the cigarette manufacturer. In Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N. J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960)
the court ruled that in view of the realities of present day
mass marketing, a remote manufacturer who puts an article
in the stream of trade and creates demand for it by adver-
tising should be held to guarantee his product to the ultimate
consumer. Such is sufficient for a jury verdict for breach
1962]
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of implied warranty of merchantability. Regarding the negli-
gence issue, authority indicates that a product that would
not ordinarily fall within the inherently dangerous products
classification may be found to be inherently dangerous so
as to render the privity requirement inapplicable where it has
been advertised as danger-free. Crist v. Art Metals Works,
supra. It is submitted that liability of the cigarette manu-
facturer for causing lung cancer may be based on either of
the above two propositions.
WALTON J. McLEOD.
TRIAL - DAMAGES - Pain and Suffering - Propriety
of Per Diem or Other Mathematical Formula in Determin-
ing Value. - In an action to recover damages for injuries
sustained in an automobile accident plaintiff's counsel was
permitted, over defendant's objection, to introduce to the
jury on a blackboard his own opinion as to the value of pain
and suffering. The evaluation was made by multiplying a
suggested per diem compensation by the number of days
of past and future pain and suffering. HELD: Reversed.
Counsel's statements of his opinion as to the per diem value
of pain and suffering had no foundation whatever in the
evidence. Such argument, to be permitted, must either be
based on facts in the record or inferentially drawn from
facts admissible in evidence. (Use of the blackboard for
other purposes was sanctioned). Harper v. Bolton, - S. C.
__., 124 S. E. 2d 54 (1962). Petition to appear amicus curiae
(rehearing) denied, limiting the decision to the facts in the
case.
No restriction is placed on the use of a blackboard to
illustrate points which are evidentiary, and control of both
oral and visual argument rests in the sound discretion of
the trial judge. Haycock v. Christie, 249 F. 2d 501 (D. C.
Cir. 1957) ; Johnson v. Charleston and Western Carolina Ry.,
234 S. C. 448, 108 S. E. 2d 777 (1959). In denying use
of the per diem formula, South Carolina adopts the minority
rule1 as set out in Botta v. Brunner, 26 N. J. 82, 138 A. 2d
1. Ten jurisdictions prohibit use of the per diem argument. Conn.
Gorezyca v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Ry., 141 Conn. 701,
109 A. 2d 589 (1954); Del. Henne v. Balick, 51 Del, 369, 146 A. 2d
394 (1958); Mlo. Faught v. Washam, 329 S. W. 2d 588 (Mo. 1959);
N. D. King v. Railway Express Agency, 107 N. W. 2d 509 (N. D.
[Vol. 14
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713, Annot., 60 A. L. R. 2d 1331 (1958). It is well established
in South Carolina that counsel may, in the course of argument,
not only make reference to the ad damnum clause, but also
has the dutfr to justify its elements. The distinction made
between reference to the total amount and reference to a
per diem amount is ultimately based on the idea that "actual
compensation in money is possible only where the injury is
to an interest of substance." III Pound, Jurisprudence 57
(1959). In other words, there is no evidentiary basis for
converting pain and suffering into money, since it has no
market value. Gorezyca v. New York, New Haven and Hart-
ford Ry., 141 Conn. 701, 109 A. 2d 589 (1954); Henne v.
Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A. 2d 394 (1958). Since there is no
standard by which the amount of damages can be fixed,
the only criterion is "fair and reasonable compensation."
Botta v. Brunner, supra; 25 C. J. S. Damages § 93, What is
fair and reasonable compensation must be determined by
the traditional trier of facts and cannot be established by
any arithmetical calculation. Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1955) ; The Mediana, Law
Reports A. C. 1900 at p. 116. In addition, the per diem
formula permits counsel to introduce testimony not other-
wise admissible in evidence, since no witness could testify
as to the value of pain and suffering, Certified T.V. and Appli-
ance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S. E. 2d 126 (1959),
and to instill in the minds of the jurors impressions not based
on the evidence. Stassum v. Chapin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 A. 2d
111 (1936). It is doubtful that a charge by the judge to the
effect that counsel's suggestions were mere argument would
remove these impressions, and an additional inequity results
because defendant's counsel must either endorse the formula
by using it to prove lesser damages or suffer the adverse
effect of it in full. Botta v. Brunner, supra. "Certainly no
amount of money per day could compensate a person re-
duced to plaintiff's position (twenty-six years old, complete
motor and sensory paralysis from waist down) and to attempt
such evalution... leads only to monstrous verdicts." (Plain-
1961); N. J. Botta v. Brunner, 26 N. J. 82, 138 A. 2d 713 (1958);
Pa. Stassum v. Chapin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 A. 111 (1936); S. C. Harper v.
Bolton, Smith's Advance Sheet, Feb. 7, 1962; W. Va. Crum v. Ward,
122 S. E. 2d 18 (W. Va. 1961); Wis. Affett v. Milwaukee and Suburban
Transport Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N. W. 2d 274 (1960); Va. Certified
T.V. and Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S. E. 2d 126
(1959), but Virginia Senate bill 74, Jan. 17, 1962, would allow use of
the per diem argument.
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tiff was awarded $70,000 for pain, suffering and disability.)
Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Ry.,
244 Minn. I at 30, 68 N. W. 2d 873 at 891 (1955).
The majority of jurisdictions which have ruled on the
question allow use of the per diem formula2 and their basic
suppositions, while similar to the minority's, lead to a different
conclusion. "In personal injury cases the exclusion of opin-
ions of value is perhaps reasonable, not because of the opinion
rule, but because there are no precise grounds, i.e., the
injury is not capable of being stated in terms of money...
Nevertheless, so long as the law gives compensation in the
shape of money, there is an inconsistency in excluding esti-
mates in money." 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1919. Evaluation
of pain and suffering is impossible, yet this is precisely the
task imposed upon the jury. Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311,
109 S. W. 2d 828 (1961). For this task, the jury should
have some guide, as an award for pain and suffering should
not be a figure pulled from the air, Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik,
234 F. 2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), and even though there is no evi-
dentiary basis to support a monetary award, the record may
show that there was and will be pain and suffering, and upon
this basis counsel has a right to state what he thinks would
be proper damages. 4-County Electric Power Ass'n. v. Clardy,
221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954). The very absence of a
standard is reason for giving counsel full latitude in ex-
ploring and discussing this element of damages. Caley v.
Manicke, 291 Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N. E. 2d 209 (1961). Coun-
sel's statements are merely argument, and the jury is free
2. Fourteen state jurisdictions allow use of the per diem argument,
Ala. McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958); Fla.
Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1958); Ill. Caley v. Manicke,
291 Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N. E. 2d 209 (1961); Ind. Kindler v. Edwards,
126 Ind. App. 261, 130 N. E. 2d 491 (1955) ; Ky. Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf,
298 Ky. 706, 183 S. W. 2d 637 (1944); Mich. Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich.
311, 109 N. W. 2d 828 (1961) ; Minn. Boutang v. Twin City Bus Co., 248
Minn. 240, 80 N. W. 2d 30 (1956); Miss. 4-County Electric Power Ass'n.
v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954); N. Y. Haley v. Hockey,
199 Misc. 512, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 717 (1950); Nev. Johnson v. Brown,
345 P. 2d 754 (Nev. 1959); Okla. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. v. Jones,
354 P. 2d 415 (Okla. 1960); Tex. J. D. Wright and Son Truckline v.
Chandler, 231 S. W. 2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Utah, Olson v. Pre-
ferred Risk Ins. Co., 11 U. 2d 23, 354 P. 2d 415 (1960); Wash. Jones v.
Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 351 P. 2d 153 (1960); Although the question
has not been ruled on in California, the argument is undoubtedly allowed
there. I Belli, Modern Trials § 31. Federal Jurisdictions: Imperial Oil,
Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F. 2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956). Probable to favor per diem:
Md. Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 169 A. 2d 661 (1961); Ohio, Miller
v. Loy, 101 Ohio App. 405, 140 N. E. 2d 38 (1956).
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to accept or reject his opinions. J. D. Wright and Son Truck-
line v. Chandler, 231 S. W. 2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
Juries automatically discount "lawyer talk" to some degree,
and judges automatically instruct that counsel's argument is
not evidence. Yates v. Wenk, supra. Per diem argument is
no more speculative than suggesting a total amount. Louis-
ville and Nashville Ry. v. Mattingly, 339 S. W. 2d 155 (Ky.
1960). "It is by no means impossible to arrive at a reason-
ably objective award for pain and suffering. What would
enable the injured.., to find amusement, entertainment and
distraction to mitigate the day to day pain and suffering
the evidence showed." Roscoe Pound, 16 NACCA L. J. 237.
In dealing with a question as subjective as the present one,
the result must be more important than the rationale. The
basis of the minority rule goes far back in the history of the
law to a time when all opinions as to value were excluded
from presentation to the jury, so that, at one time, even
opinions as to the value of real estate were not allowed.
Gradually, juries were given the help of "experts" so that
their determinations could be more equitable. However, for
the area of human pain there are no experts. Pain has no
value, even though the courts have chosen to make it com-
pensable. The question resolves to how to determine how
much compensation will be given, and to answer this question
empty rationalization and partisan differences must be care-
fully avoided in an attempt to gain a measure of predictable
and consistent justice. The minority rule severely restricts
counsel's ability to justify pain and suffering as an element
of damages, and it limits his right to argue his case freely,
while the abuse which is sought to be controlled is already
controlled both by the trial judge and by appellate review.
More unfortunate, the minority rule leaves the jury with ab-
solutely no standard in a subjective inquiry, a state which
seems likely to lead to gross inconsistency. The majority
rule allows counsel to establish a frame of reference which,
to be practical, brings the inquiry to a plane which is not
totally metaphysical and does not necessarily (or even prob-
ably) lead to an excessive award. Until such time as pain
can be accurately measured, evaluation will be by estima-
tion. This estimation will necessarily be beneficially con-
trolled and will approach reality through the application of
some objective standard, one which places the inquiry on a
1962]
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level which the juror can comprehend and discuss, such as the
per diem standard.
D. REECE WILLIAMS III.
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